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系統識別號 U0026-0812200911095353
論文名稱(中文) 董事會組成、公股角色與企業績效之關聯性研究
論文名稱(英文) Study on Board Composition, State Owned Minor Ownership and performance
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 企業管理學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Business Administration
學年度 92
學期 2
出版年 93
研究生(中文) 陳家馴
研究生(英文) Chia-Hsun Chen
學號 r4691110
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 64頁
口試委員 口試委員-陳忠仁
指導教授-吳學良
召集委員-潘偉華
口試委員-蔡明田
中文關鍵字 董事會  公股管理  公股管理 
英文關鍵字 state ownership  corporate governance  coporate board 
學科別分類
中文摘要   在商業經營上,隨著營運複雜度的增加,在所有者與專業經理人資訊不對稱、目標不一致的情形下,使得代理問題長期困擾公司之經營。而在公司治理的研究方面,以往對於先進國家的上市公司或民營企業則多有所著墨,惟對於政府持股事業則較無探討。因此,本研究除探討政府持股企業之董事會組成與企業績效之關係,並進一步分析公股於其中之角色。本研究以政府持股5%以上企業為主要研究對象,次級資料蒐集之來源為證券基金會與台灣經濟新報資料庫。資料經整理及比對後,共獲得48家公司,三個年份(2000至02年),共144筆資料,透過pooled method迴歸分析,獲得研究結果如下:
  第一:在主要變數與企業績效之關係上,其與企業績效之關係獲得顯著支持,全體董事持股比率與企業績效呈現倒U型之關係。金融機構董事持股比率、董事會規模則與企業績效呈現負向顯著關係。顯示全體董事持股比率與企業績效之關係為一非線性的關係,而金融機構董事持股比率、董事會規模愈小企業績效則會愈佳。
  在公股角色方面,『是否曾為公營事業』、公股偏離程度與企業績效呈現負向顯著關係。意味當樣本曾為公營事業或樣本公司公股偏離程度愈高時,則企業績效愈差。惟公股董事席次比率與企業績效則呈現正向顯著關係,意味公股董事席次比率愈高則企業績效愈佳。
  第二:在變數間交互作用影響後與企業績效之關係方面,本研究整理顯著之交互作用組合並歸納出以下兩種有效或無效組合。金融機構董事持股愈高、公股董事席次比率愈高可減輕大型董事會對績效的負面影響。金融機構董事持股愈高、董事會規模愈高搭配公股偏離程度則可以緩和原先公股偏離程度與績效之負向關係,進而使得企業績效上升。而在無效組合方面,公股偏離程度可反轉公股董事席次對績效的正向影響,使得企業績效下降。
英文摘要   The fundamental insight from which the field of corporate governance emanates is that there are potential problems associated with the separation of ownership and control inherent in the modern corporate form of organization. Corporate governance, then, encompasses the set of institutional and market mechanisms that induce self-interested managers (the controllers) to maximize the value of the residual cash flows of the firm on behalf of its shareholders (the owners).
  As most of the prior research on corporate governance has covered the listed companies in developed and developing economies, few touch this issue from the perspective of state ownership. This study aimed to explore the role of state ownership in the relationship between board composition and performance in the enterprises with minor state ownership.
  Based on 48 firms with at least 5% state shareholdings by the end of 2002, we use regression technique to treat the pooled 3-year time series and cross-section data. The results show that (1) shareholdings of all board members have an inverted U relationship with Tobin Q ratio; both bank ownership on the board and board size are negatively associated with Tobin Q. (2) The status of former SOE, deviation of state owned control right and cash flow right are negatively associated with Tobin Q while minor state appointing seats on the board function as a positive monitoring role for the management, and thus enhance firm performance. (3) In our interaction analysis, both bank ownership and state control right on the board act as a positive moderating role while deviation of state owned control right and cash flow right generate the negative moderating effect on the relationship between corporate governance and performance.
論文目次 第一章 研究動機與研究目的…………………………………………1
第一節 研究動機與背景………………………………………………1
第二節 研究目的………………………………………………………3
第三節 研究流程………………………………………………………6
第四節 章節安排………………………………………………………7

第二章 文獻探討………………………………………………………8
第一節 代理問題與公司治理…………………………………………8
第二節 董事會組成與企業績效之關係………………………………12
第三節 公股角色與企業績效之關係…………………………………18
第四節 董事會組成與公股角色隻結合與企業績效之關係…………26
第五節 小結……………………………………………………………28

第三章 研究方法………………………………………………………29
第一節 研究架構………………………………………………………29
第二節 變數衡量………………………………………………………30
第三節 研究樣本………………………………………………………32
第四節 研究方法………………………………………………………34

第四章 實證結果與分析………………………………………………36
第一節 董事會組成、公股角色與企業績效之關係…………………36
第二節 董事會組成與公股角色之交互作用與企業績效之關係……41
第三節 小結……………………………………………………………48

第五章 結論與建議……………………………………………………49
第一節 研究結論………………………………………………………49
第二節 研究貢獻………………………………………………………55
第三節 研究建議與限制………………………………………………56

參考文獻…………………………………………………………………58
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二、中文部分

1.劉紹樑(民91), 從莊子到安隆:A+公司治理, 天下雜誌。

2.葉銀華(民87), 「家族控股、董事會組成與經營績效—台灣家族企業管治機制之研究」, 行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計劃成果報告。

3.薛琦與胡仲英(民88), 民營化政策的回顧與展望, 台灣民營化的經驗,頁 1-36。台北:中華徵信社。

4.吳學良(民92), 從市場、政府與公營事業觀點再探民營化政策, 經社法制論叢,第32期,頁211-255。
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