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系統識別號 U0026-0812200911063838
論文名稱(中文) 公司治理與公司績效之交互作用對股利政策之衝擊
論文名稱(英文) The Impact of Corporate Governance and Firm Performance on Dividend Payout Policy
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 92
學期 2
出版年 93
研究生(中文) 王翔民
研究生(英文) Shiang-Ming Wang
學號 r1691114
學位類別 碩士
語文別 英文
論文頁數 79頁
口試委員 口試委員-林玲芬
指導教授-陳嬿如
口試委員-吳清在
中文關鍵字 公司績效  公司治理  股利 
英文關鍵字 corporate governance  dividend  firm performance 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本論文主要的目的是要探討台灣上市櫃公司公司治理、公司績效與股利政策間之相關性。
股利政策這個議題長久以來不斷地被討論,不只是因為股利扮演著股票投資報酬的角色,更因為股利政策能夠透露出公司的相關資訊。
實證結果顯示,公司獲利能力、公司的成長機會公司規模會影響公司股利發放的多寡與否,對台灣公司來說,公司規模越大、獲利能力越高以及公司成長機會越好傾向於發放更多的股利。
在Tobit及OLS迴歸分析的第一個部分顯示,內部人的持股比例顯著影響公司股利發放的多寡與否,證明了公司治理相關議題與股利發放間直接關係的存在(direct effect)。在OLS迴歸分析第二部分中證明內部人藉著影響公司績效來間接影響公司股利政策的狀況存在於台灣上市櫃公司中(joint/indirect effect)。最後在三階段最小平方法(3SLS)中不僅再一次證明間接關係之存在,同時也證明在這些變數間內生性的存在,藉著3SLS得到更精確的實證結果。
在討論間接關係存在與否時,發現到台灣上市櫃公司公司治理機制的缺乏,導致內部或外部的監督能力不足,使得公司內部之董監事擁有許多自利的機會,由實證結果來看,內部人一方面無法提升公司績效,另一方面去傾向發放更多現金股利。而獨立董事的功能也在實證結果中證明,獨立董事使公司績效明顯提升,同時也顯著影響公司的股利政策。
英文摘要 This study intents to investigate the relation between corporate governance, firm performance and dividend payout policy in Taiwanese firms.
A firm’s dividend payout policy being an essential topic to firm’s management is because it does not only represent a return to shareholder’ investment but it also contains the information about the value of the firm. What factors or characteristics do influence a firm’s dividend payout policy? In the categorical analysis, the firm performance, firm size and investment opportunities of a firm are associated with the dividend payout level significantly. The result of Tobin’s regression analysis, OLS regression analysis and 3SLS regression analysis indicate the existence of single effect and joint effect on the dividend payout policy. The single (direct) effect of the corporate governance or performance and the joint (indirect) effect of the interaction between governance and performance on dividend payout policy exist in Taiwanese firm. The insiders including the directors and managers indeed affect the dividend payout policy directly and indirectly. The insiders influence dividend payout policy not only by the influential power due to the high ownership but also by choosing the operational or financial strategies that affect the firm performance which in turns determine dividend payout.
It is believed that the dividend could serve the tool to reduce the agency cost and these exists a negative relation between insider ownership and dividend payout level. However, the positive relation between insiders’ ownership and dividend payout level in this study implies an entrenchment effect of insider ownership may exist. In addition, according to result of the categorical analysis, generally, directors have the absolute controlling power in the firm due to the managerial function of directors in Taiwanese firms. Nevesthesless, independent directors and supervisors still provide the monitoring function in improving firm performance and in reducing the agency cost by increasing the dividend payout level.

論文目次 CHAPTER1. INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 1
1.2. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH AND MAJOR FINDINGS 3
1.3 IMPORTANCE OF THIS RESEARCH 8
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THIS STUDY 9
CHAPTER2. LITERATURE REVIEW 10
2.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DIVIDEND PAYOUT POLICY 11
2.2 FIRM PERFORMANCE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 14
2.3 SUMMARY 15
CHAPTER 3 DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 16
3.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES ABOUT SINGLE (DIRECT)
EFFECT ON THE DIVIDEND POLICY 16
3.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES ABOUT JOINT (INDIRECT)
EFFECT ON DIVIDEND POLICY 18
CHAPTER 4 EMPIRICAL MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 20
4.1 DATA SELECTION 20
4.2 VARIABLE DEFINITION 20
4.3 METHODOLOGY 24
4.3.1. Categorical Analysis 24
4.3.2.Tobin’s Regression 25
4.3.3.OLS Test 26
4.3.4. 3SLS Regression 28
CHAPTER 5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 30
5.1 THE RESULTS OF CATEGORICAL ANALYSIS 30
5.1.1 Wilcoxon Two-sample test results of firm factors 30
5.2.2 Wilcoxon Test results on the interaction between
firm factors and Governance factors 32
5.2.3 Test Result of the relation between
Director/ Managerial ownership on dividend
policy under high MTB 34
5.3 TEST RESULT OF TOBIN’S REGRESSION ANALYSIS 35
5.4 TEST RESULTS OF ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS)
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 39
5.5 TEST RESULTS OF THREE-STAGE LEAST
SQUARES (3SLS) REGRESSION ANALYSIS 42
CHAPTER 6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 46
REFERENCE 50



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