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系統識別號 U0026-0812200911054597
論文名稱(中文) 董事會組成與股權結構對高階主管更迭、公司價值與績效之關聯性-以台灣上市(櫃)金融業及電子業為例
論文名稱(英文) none
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 企業管理學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Business Administration
學年度 92
學期 2
出版年 93
研究生(中文) 遲銘俊
研究生(英文) Ming-Chun Chih
學號 r4691128
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 59頁
口試委員 指導教授-姜傳益
召集委員-何怡滿
指導教授-許溪南
中文關鍵字 高階管理者更迭  董事會組成  價值衡量  公司治理  股權結構 
英文關鍵字 corporate governance  executive turnover  value creation  the composition of board  the structure of ownerships 
學科別分類
中文摘要   在台灣加入WTO之後,本國產業的經營環境變的更加嚴峻,而績效導向的觀念更是不可擋之趨勢與潮流,且高階主管替換的頻率越見頻繁,顯示高階主管更替之問題越顯重要。本研究在探討,本國金融業及電子業公司董事會組成與股權結構對公司價值、公司績效與高階主管更迭之影響。
  本研究樣本選取了27家金融產業的公司及170家電子產業的公司,樣本期間為2001年到2003年。研究方法運用panel data方法進行複迴歸分析以探討董事會組成與股權結構對價值衡量及公司績效之影響,並運用Logistic迴歸,探討董事會組成與股權結構及公司經營績效對高階主管更迭之影響。
  本研究實證結論如下:管理者持股比率與公司價值衡量呈現非線性關係,董事長兼任總經理對公司價值是正向或負向影響,似乎還需端視管理者個人的道德操守問題。最大股東行為對公司價值、ROA、EVA皆有負向的影響,但對MVA則為正向影響,其原因可能是當最大股東有監督管理者的動機時,將可使管理者朝股東財富極大的方向做決策,而使得公司的市場評價提升,若是以最大股東侵佔公司資產的角度來看,最大股東為了使自身獲得最大利潤,也會設法提高公司資產的市場價值,因此最大股東行為才會對MVA有正向的影響;相對的,次大股東行為能夠發揮對最大股東(控制股東)的監督制衡效果,內部董事及專業董事對公司價值及公司績效亦有正向的影響。而獨立董事在金融業對MVA為正向影響,在電子業則是對MVA有負向影響,其原因可能是過多的獨立董事(當比率超過17.23%時)反而會導致不佳的公司績效,另外,本研究也支持規模較小的董事會較能發揮效力。
  在高階主管更迭方面,管理者持股比率與獨立董事比率對高階主管更迭機率為負向影響,最大股東行為、內部董事比率及專業董事比率對高階主管更迭機率為正向影響,而董事長兼任總經理則是對高階主管更迭機率沒有顯著的影響性。在公司績效與高階主管更迭方面,在金融業,只有MVA與高階主管更迭之間有顯著的正相關;而在電子業,則是只有ROA與高階主管更迭之間有顯著的負向影響,這個結果是比較合乎當公司績效差則高階主管較易被更迭的常理。而金融業的實證結果,可能需再進一步將高階主管更迭的原因做區分,才可再進一步的作更精確的解釋。
英文摘要  The research samples include 27 financial companies and 170 electronics companies from 2001 to 2003. First, this study discusses the impact of the composition of the board and the ownership structure on value creation, and then on top executive turnover.
 The results of this study are as follows: The correlation between percentage of ownership hold by top executive and value creation is non-linear. Whether the chairman of the board who is also top executive has positive or negative impact on value creation seems to depend on the moral of manager. Behavior of major shareholders has negative impact on value creation, ROA and EVA, but has positive impact on MVA. The reason is probably that major shareholders have incentive to monitor managers, and so managers will make decision by the principle of maximizing shareholders’ wealth. Then the firm will deserve high market evaluation. If we discuss from a different aspect that major shareholders will loot assets of company. In order to maximize interest, major shareholders will raise the market value of assets possibly. So, behavior of major shareholders has positive impact on MVA. Relatively, behavior of secondary shareholders has supervising power on major shareholders, inside directors and professional directors also have positive impact on value creation and performance. Outside directors has positive impact on MVA in financial industry, but has negative impact in electronic industry. Perhaps the reason is that too many outside directors will lead to poor performance. Additionally, this study supports that smaller board of directors is more effective than bigger ones.
 With regard to the probability of turnover, percentage of ownership hold by top executive and outside directors have negative impact on the probability of turnover. Behaviors of major shareholders, inside directors and professional directors have positive impact on the probability of turnover. The chairman of the board is also top executive doesn’t have significant impact on the probability of turnover. With regard to the correlation between performance and the probability of turnover, only MVA has significantly positive impact on the probability of turnover in financial industry. It seems reasonable that only ROA has significantly negative impact on the probability of turnover in electronics industry. However, the empirical results in financial industry may be explained more precisely by classifying the reason of executive turnover into several types.
論文目次 第壹章 緒論...............................1
第一節 研究動機...........................1
第二節 研究目的...........................3
第三節 本文架構...........................3
第貳章 文獻探討...........................5
第一節 董事會組成與公司價值及公司績效.....5
第二節 股權結構與公司價值及公司績效.......7
第三節 高階主管更迭理論...................9
第四節 公司績效之衡量....................10
第五節 過去文獻對本文之啟示..............11
第參章 研究設計..........................12
第一節 樣本來源與資料蒐集................12
第二節 研究假說..........................12
第三節 變數定義..........................17
第四節 實證分析方法......................20
第五節 實證模型..........................22
第肆章 實證結果與分析....................24
第一節 樣本敘述統計......................24
第二節 實證分析..........................28
第三節 預測機率..........................43
第伍章 結論與建議........................45
第一節 結論..............................45
第二節 建議..............................46
參考文獻.................................48
附錄.....................................54
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