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系統識別號 U0026-0812200910215309
論文名稱(中文) 董監事股權質押之代理問題對會計資訊與公司績效之影響
論文名稱(英文) The effects of shares collateralized by board of directors on accounting earnings and firm performance
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 90
學期 2
出版年 91
研究生(中文) 高蘭芬
研究生(英文) Lan-Feng Kao
學號 r1887101
學位類別 博士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 128頁
口試委員 指導教授-邱正仁
指導教授-吳清在
口試委員-王明隆
口試委員-張紹基
口試委員-吳欽杉
口試委員-王泰昌
口試委員-柯承恩
中文關鍵字 公司治理  會計盈餘  質押  控制股東  監督機制 
英文關鍵字 Return-earnings relation  Corporate governance  Controlling shareholders  Collateralized shares  Monitoring mechanisms 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本論文的研究目的有二,首先探討董監事持股質押的代理問題對會計資訊與股票報酬相關性之影響,以驗證質押所引發的代理問題會降低公司盈餘資訊與股價報酬的相關性。其次,本論文探討董監事持股質押之代理問題對公司績效之影響,且進一步從公司治理的角度,探討三個控制機制—來自於機構投資人的監督、來自於債權人的監督以及股利政策,能否有效降低董監事持股質押的代理問題對公司績效的影響。
研究結果發現,當公司董監事持股質押比率愈高,公司盈餘資訊與股價變動的相關性愈低。由於董監事持股質押加深控制股東與外部股東之間的代理問題,造成當期盈餘對未來經營績效的預測力下降,加上盈餘管理的誘因增強,降低財務報導的可信度,都會造成盈餘資訊與股票報酬的相關性降低。
其次,本研究也發現董監事持股質押對盈餘資訊與股票報酬相關性的弱化效果,在虧損公司及股價表現不佳公司會較嚴重。當公司處於虧損狀態時或股價表現不佳時,公司股價較容易出現下跌壓力,使得擁有管理控制權之董監事,因為個人財務困難而剝奪公司資產以及盈餘管理的可能性增加,因此即使公司當期盈餘有好消息,市場也會因為潛在代理問題較嚴重,而降低對盈餘好消息的反應。
實證結果也發現董監事持股質押對盈餘資訊與股價報酬相關性的弱化效果,在非電子類股會較電子類股嚴重。台灣電子類股產品競爭性強,需要專業團隊,其法人股東大都不是來自同一家族企業,因此法人股東之間可以相互監督,董事會的監督功能也較強,因此潛在的代理問題較輕。這種來自監督機制所帶來的利益會降低董監事持股質押對盈餘資訊與股票報酬相關性的弱化效果。
本論文也發現董監事持股質押對公司績效有顯著的負面影響。如果將樣本再區分為集團公司與非集團公司兩個子樣本,則進一步發現,董監事持股質押與公司績效的負向關係,主要出現在集團公司,在非集團公司兩者的關係不顯著。該結果隱含董監事持股質押所帶來的代理問題,在集團公司比在非集團公司來得嚴重。
最後本論文的結果支持三個公司監督機制─機構投資人、債權人及股利政策,能有效降低董監事持股質押所引發的代理問題,進而改善公司的經營績效。實證結果發現,當公司機構投資人的持股比率愈高、負債比率愈高,以及股利率愈高,董監事持股質押比率對財務績效的負面影響愈小。此外,董監事持股質押所引發的代理問題在集團公司會較非集團公司嚴重,因此上述三個監督機制降低代理問題的利益,在集團公司會較非集團公司顯著。
英文摘要 The purposes of this dissertation are to examine the effect of the agency problem due to collateralized shares on the relation between accounting earnings and stock prices and the effect of the agency problem on the firm performance. I further investigate whether monitoring mechanisms including institutional investors, creditors and dividend policy can alleviate the agency problem due to shares as collateral by board of directors.
The empirical results show that the higher the extent of shares as collateral by the board of directors, the weaker the relation between the accounting earnings and stock prices. Collateralized shares will reinforce the agency problem between controlling shareholders and outside shareholders leading to lower prediction power of current earnings on future earnings. Furthermore, shares as collateral by the board of directors raise the incentives of earnings management. Earnings management will reduce the credibility of accounting numbers and thus will mitigate the relation between accounting earnings and stock returns.
Moreover, I also find that the effect of collateralized shares on the relation between accounting earnings and stock prices is even weaker for the firm experiencing losses or for the firms experiencing stock price decline. When firm experience losses or stock price decline, the managers might have higher incentives to expropriate outsider shareholders or to engage in earnings management. Hence, the stock market might not positively response to good news in earnings because of severe agency problems.
The effect of collateralized stock on the relation between accounting earnings and stock prices is also weaker for the non-electronic firms than for the electronic firms. Electronic firms typically face strong product competition and need professional supports. Under this scenario, institutional investors are generally not from the same family and can monitor one another more efficiently. Thus, monitoring from the board is stronger for the electronic firms and leads to less severe agency problems. The monitoring from the board lessens the adverse effect of shares as collateral by board of directors on price-earnings relation.
For the firm performance, this dissertation indicates that there is an inverse relationship between shares as collateral and firm performance. When the entire sample is divided into a subsample of conglomerate firms and a subsample of non-conglomerate firms, I further show that the inverse relationship exists only in conglomerate firms. The findings imply that agency problems resulting from shares as collateral by board of directors are more serious in conglomerate firms than in non-conglomerate firms.
Finally, this dissertation provides evidence that the monitoring from institutional investors, creditors and dividend policy can reduce the agency problems of shares as collateral effectively and thus can improve firm performance. Empirical findings indicate that institutional holdings, debt ratio and dividend payout ratio can mitigate the negative effect of agency problems on firm performance. In addition, monitoring mechanisms are more beneficial in conglomerate firms than in non-conglomerate firms.
論文目次 第壹章 緒論………………………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究背景與動機………………………………………………………1
第二節 研究目的……………………………………………..………………6
第三節 董監事股權質押之揭露………………………………………………7
第貳章 相關文獻探討…………………………………………………………..10
第一節 董監事因素與公司價值……………………………………………..10
第二節 會計資訊的資本市場研究…………………………………………..12
第三節 控制股東(家族)與外部股東的代理衝突…………..……………..15
第四節 董監事股權質押與經營績效………………………………………..18
第五節 公司控制監督機制…………………………………….…………..20
第參章 研究設計……………………………………………………..…………..25
第一節 董監事持股質押與會計資訊的攸關性………………….………..25
第二節 公司績效與董監事持股質押………………………………………..30
第三節 監督機制是否降低持股質押所引發的代理問題…………………..32
第肆章 資料來源、變數定義及實證模型………………………………………..39
第一節 資料來源……………………………………………………………..39
第二節 董監事持股質押對會計資訊攸關性之實證設計…………………..39
第三節 董監事持股質押影響公司績效之實證設計………………………..43
第四節 監督機制對質押代理問題影響之實證設計…………….……..…..46
第伍章 董監事持股質押對會計盈餘與股票報酬相關性之影響……………...50
第一節 敘述統計分析………………………………………………………..50
第二節 質押對會計盈餘資訊的影響………………………………………..51
第三節 虧損與股價漲跌下質押對會計盈餘資訊的影響…………………..53
第四節 產業別下質押對會計盈餘資訊的影響……………………………..54
第五節 考慮其他變數衡量…………………………………………………..56
第陸章 監督機制對董監事持股質押的影響……………………………………..77
第一節 敘述統計分析……………………….……………………………….77
第二節 董監事持股質押對公司績效的影響…………………………….....78
第三節 集團公司下董監事持股質押對公司績效的影響………………….79
第四節 監督機制降低董監事持股質押的代理衝突………………….81
第五節 考慮其他質押變數衡量……………………………………………..83
第柒章 結論與建議……………………………………………………………103
第一節 結論……………………….……………………………….……….103
第二節 政策意涵與研究方向………………………………………………104
參考文獻………………………………………………………………………….106
附錄……………………………………………………………………………….112
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