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系統識別號 U0026-0808201609025000
論文名稱(中文) 股票購回與成本僵固性
論文名稱(英文) Share Repurchase and Cost Stickiness
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 財務金融研究所碩士在職專班
系所名稱(英) Graduate Institute of Finance (on the job class)
學年度 104
學期 2
出版年 105
研究生(中文) 陳美綺
研究生(英文) Mei-Chi Chen
學號 r87031299
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 18頁
口試委員 指導教授-周庭楷
召集委員-詹凌菁
口試委員-陳宇紳
中文關鍵字 股票購回  成本僵固性 
英文關鍵字 share repurchase  cost stickiness 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本研究主要探討公司執行股票購回與成本僵固間的關聯性。過去文獻顯示股票購回具有傳遞管理階層私有訊息的功能,且會搭配輔佐性工具以增強其傳訊功能,因此本研究檢驗成本僵固性是否亦為公司釋放訊息的工具之一,並與股票購回互相增強彼此的傳訊功能,以改善投資人和管理階層間資訊不對稱的關係。本研究以1985年至2014年美國上市公司為研究對象,探討股票購回與成本僵固間的關係,以迴歸分析方法進行實證。實證結果顯示,執行固定價格股票購回的企業,成本僵固性程度較高。
英文摘要 This paper focuses on the relationship between share repurchase and cost stickiness. The prior literature commonly suggests that managers use stock repurchase to signal private information, and also use these along with other actions to reinforce such signals. In this study we examine whether managers use cost stickiness prior to stock repurchase to strengthen the credibility of signal, using a sample of U.S. publicly traded companies over the period 1985-2014. The empirical results show that cost stickiness prior to a fixed-price tender offer is an indicator of managerial intent to signal favorable private information.
論文目次 第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻探討 3
第一節 股票購回相關文獻 3
第二節 成本僵固性相關文獻 4
第三節 假說發展 6
第三章 研究方法 7
第一節 實證模型設計與變數定義 7
第二節 資料來源、研究期間及樣本選取 9
第四章 實證結果分析 10
第一節 敘述性統計 10
第二節 相關係數 11
第三節 迴歸分析 12
第五章 結論 14
參考文獻 15
參考文獻 一、 中文部分
林有志、傅鍾仁、陳筱平(2011),「成本僵固性之實證研究」,當代會計,第12卷第2期,頁191-220。
高世隆(2010),「成本僵固性之堆疊品牌效用關聯性之研究-以筆記型電腦相關產業為例」,國立台北大學會計研究所碩士論文。
郭冠汝(2007),「產品多角化與產能利用率對成本習性之影響:成本黏滯性之檢測」,國立中正大學會計與資訊科技研究所碩士論文。
曾聯洲(2003),「銷管費用僵固性之研究」,國立政治大學會計研究所碩士論文。
二、 英文部分
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Noreen, E. (1991), “Conditions under which activity-based costs provide relevant costs.” Journal of Management Accounting Research, 3, pp.159-168.
Noreen, E. and Soderstrom, N. (1997), “The accuracy of proportional cost models: Evidence from hospital service departments.” Review of Accounting Studies, 2, pp.89-114.
Persons, J. (1994), “Signaling and takeover deterrence with stock repurchase: Dutch auctions versus fixed price tender offers.” Journal of Finance, 49, pp.1373-1402.
Peyer, U. and Vermaelen, T. (2006), “The nature and persistence of buyback anomalies.” Working paper, INSEAD.
Ruhnka, J. and Bagby, J. (1986), “Disclosure: Damned if you do, damned if you don’t.” Harvard Business Review, 64, pp.34-39.
Stephens, C. P. and Weisbach, M. S. (1998), “Actual share reacquisition in open-market repurchase programs.” Journal of Finance, 53, pp.313-333.
Stickney, C. and Brown, P. (1999), “Financial reporting and Statement analysis.” Orlando, FL: Dryden, pp.219-222.
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Subramaniam, C. and Weidenmier, M. L. (2003), “Additional evidence the sticky behavior of costs.” Working paper, Texas Christian University.
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