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系統識別號 U0026-0807202014154600
論文名稱(中文) 探討管理階層過度自信、過度投資與股利支付之關聯性
論文名稱(英文) A Study on the Relation among Managerial Overconfidence, Overinvestment and Dividend Payout
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 財務金融研究所
系所名稱(英) Graduate Institute of Finance
學年度 108
學期 2
出版年 109
研究生(中文) 陳如意
研究生(英文) Ju-Yi Chen
學號 R86074082
學位類別 碩士
語文別 英文
論文頁數 27頁
口試委員 指導教授-顏盟峯
口試委員-許永明
口試委員-許英麟
中文關鍵字 股利支付  自由現金流量  過度自信  過度投資 
英文關鍵字 Dividend Payout  Free Cash Flow  Overconfidence  Overinvestment 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本研究通過實證研究了管理者過度自信、低效率投資、股利政策和自由現金流量之間的關係,並檢驗台灣的公司管理者過度自信如何影響低效率的投資支出。過度自信的經理人傾向於相信他們的能力可以為公司帶來豐厚的利潤,所以他們將負淨現值的投資項目視為是有價值的。因此,經理人是過度自信的公司比同業更有可能擁有過高的投資支出。高額的自由現金流量將導致管理者進行更無效率的投資。管理者的過度自信將在股利支出及投資扭曲間扮演一個調節的角色。我們使用大量的台灣上市公司樣本進行測試,期間為1999年到2019年。我們的證據表明,管理者過度自信將影響投資扭曲及股利支付間的關係。
英文摘要 This study investigates empirically the relationship among the managerial overconfidence, the inefficiency investment, dividend policy and free cash flow, and also tests how the managerial overconfidence affects the inefficient investment expenditure in Taiwan. Overconfident CEOs tend to believe their ability to bring good profit to the company. This trait makes them refer to the investment projects with negative net present value as valuable. Therefore, the firms with overconfident CEOs are more likely to own higher investment expenditure than the peers. High free cash flow will cause managers to invest more inefficiently. The managerial overconfidence will play an interactive role in investment distortion and dividend payout. Using a large number of samples of publicly listed firms in Taiwan for the period from 1999 to 2019, our empirical evidence shows that overconfidence will affect the relationship between investment distortion and dividend payout.
論文目次 摘要 I
Abstract II
Contents III
List of tables IV
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
Chapter 2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 4
2.1 Literature Review 4
2.2 Hypotheses Development 7
Chapter 3 Data and Variables 9
3.1 Data and sample selection 9
3.2 The measurement of CEO overconfidence 9
3.3 The measurement of investment efficiency 9
3.4 The measurement of dividend policy 10
3.5 Research Design 10
Chapter 4 Empirical Results 13
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 13
4.2 Test of Hypothesis 1 17
4.3 Test of Hypothesis 2 19
4.4 Test of Hypothesis 3 20
Chapter 5 Conclusion and Suggestion 22
References 24
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