||CEO Paycut and Earnings Forecast Behavior
||Department of Accountancy
management earnings forecasts
The study examines the influence of CEO paycut to their subsequent earnings forecasts. We argue that paycut will result in two opposing motives: the one is to repair reputations by issuing more numbers of and substitute point estimate for range estimate, the other is to avert risk so that managers will reduce the numbers of issuing and substitute range estimate for point estimate. We find that managers exhibit decreased frequency of issuing earnings forecasts and substitute range estimate with point estimate following paycut. Furthermore, the mechanism of paycut to manager earnings forecast behaviors is more significant to less sophisticated managers. However, we do not find the relation between paycut and forecast bias. In summary, our results suggest that once managers are cut their pay, the motive of risk aversion dominantly influence their earnings forecast behavior.
第一章 緒論 1
第二章 文獻回顧及假說推導 3
第三章 變數衡量及研究設計 5
第一節 樣本選擇 5
第二節 變數衡量 5
第四章 實證結果 8
第一節 敘述性統計 8
第二節 迴歸結果 12
第三節 額外測試一 減薪與盈餘預測偏誤之關聯 13
第四節 額外測試二 經理人任期的調節效果 15
第五節 穩健性測試 19
第五章 結論 19
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