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系統識別號 U0026-0507201117005000
論文名稱(中文) 自由現金流量與公司治理
論文名稱(英文) Free Cash Flow and Corporate Governance
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系碩博士班
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 99
學期 2
出版年 100
研究生(中文) 吳枚珮
研究生(英文) Mei-Pei Wu
學號 R16981065
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 76頁
口試委員 指導教授-吳清在
口試委員-劉啟群
口試委員-郭啟賢
中文關鍵字 自由現金流量  公司績效  公司治理 
英文關鍵字 Free cash flow  Firm performance  Corporate governance 
學科別分類
中文摘要 本研究旨在探討自由現金流量、公司治理與公司績效之關聯,以及公司治理因素是否會影響自由現金流量對於公司績效的效果。最後,探討公司治理因素是否能降低自由現金流量之偏離程度。本研究係以2007年至2009年台灣上市櫃電子公司為研究對象,共2211筆觀測值為樣本。實證結果顯示:(1)自由現金流量與公司績效呈非單調之線性關係,自由現金流量對公司績效的正向影響力會隨著自由現金流量遞增而遞減。因為過高的自由現金流量將會誘使經理人過度投資、特權消費等不明智使用行為,導致投資邊際效率降低。(2)董事會規模、獨立董事與經理人持股對公司績效皆有顯著之影響。(3)董事會規模愈大會減弱自由現金流量對於公司績效的提升效果;而經理人持股則會增強自由現金流量對於公司績效的提升效果。(4)董事會規模愈小、經理人持股愈多與大股東持股愈少能降低自由現金流量之偏離程度。公司較不可能有投資不足與過度投資的問題。本研究結果,希望能為近年來努力推動公司治理的管理當局或公司提供一個建立完善的公司治理制度參考方向,並給予公司經營者了解如何使用自由現金流量能為公司股東帶來最大之利益,且讓投資者在做投資決策時有一個思考依據。
英文摘要 The purpose of this study is to investigate the association among free cash flow, corporate governance and firm performance. In addition, it consists in examining whether corporate governance mechanisms affect the influence of free cash flow on the firm performance. Furthermore, this study also examines whether corporate governance factors can reduce the deviation of the free cash flow. Listed publicly electronic companies in Taiwan from 2007 to 2009 were used as a sample to test the hypotheses by regression analysis in the research. The results suggest: (1) The relationship between free cash flow and firm performance is not monotonically linear. The effect of free cash flow on improving the firm performance will diminish with increasing free cash flow. Because of high free cash flow, management may do something unwise causing to decrease the marginal benefit of investment such as over-investment and privilege of spending. (2) Board size, independent directors and manager ownership all significantly influence the firm performance. (3) The firm with larger board size is more likely to reduce the effect of free cash flow on improving the firm performance; however manager ownership could enhance the effect of free cash flow on improving the firm performance. (4) The smaller of board size, the higher manager ownership and the lower major shareholders ownership reduce the deviation of the free cash flow. Therefore, the possibility of insufficient investment and over-investment may be lower.
論文目次 第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究問題與目的 4
第三節 研究架構 5
第四節 研究流程 6
第二章 文獻探討 7
第一節 自由現金流量 7
第二節 公司治理之簡介 10
第三節 台灣公司治理現況 13
第四節 公司治理相關文獻 16
第三章 研究設計 27
第一節 研究假說 27
第二節 研究變數定義與衡量 32
第三節 研究期間與樣本 39
第四節 研究模型建立 40
第四章 實證結果與分析 44
第一節 基本敘述性統計 44
第二節 相關係數分析 47
第三節 迴歸結果分析 49
第五章 結論與建議 62
第一節 實證結果與發現 62
第二節 研究限制 64
第三節 研究建議 64
參考文獻 66

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