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系統識別號 U0026-0307201222360800
論文名稱(中文) 董監事的學歷與專業背景對於公司獲利能力之影響: 臺灣電子產業之實證研究
論文名稱(英文) The Impact of Board Directors’ Education and Professional Background on Firms Performance: Evidence from Taiwanese Publicly Traded Electronics Firms
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 財務金融研究所
系所名稱(英) Graduate Institute of Finance & Banking
學年度 100
學期 2
出版年 101
研究生(中文) 張清麗
研究生(英文) Truong Thanh De
學號 R86997044
學位類別 碩士
語文別 英文
論文頁數 48頁
口試委員 口試委員-李漢星
指導教授-林軒竹
口試委員-王澤世
中文關鍵字 none 
英文關鍵字 corporate governance  family control  board size  board composition  financial performance  equity structure 
學科別分類
中文摘要 公司治理係經營管理制度之核心,良好公司治理有助於提升企業經營效率與效果。世界銀行發佈的公司治理原則(1999)指出董監事為公司治理制度與運作上的核心。因此,公司董監事績效之影響不但受到重視,還成爲公司治理的熱門議題。在先前的文獻中,主要探討董監事的特性,如公司董監事的大小規模、外部董事的比例、獨立性、董監事的忙碌程度等。本研究除了探討上述特性,更加入董監事的學歷與專業背景等變數來分析董監事對於公司獲利能力之影響。研究對象為從2006-2010年連續上市之1535間臺灣電子產業公司作樣本,以回歸方法統計分析,最後得到結果顯示在電子高度市場競爭的環境下,公司董監事的學歷與專業背景平等對於公司獲利並不存在任何關係。當將公司董監事的學歷與專業背景單獨分析,董監事的學歷對於公司獲利顯得正相關顯著而專業背景顯得非相關顯著。
英文摘要 In recent years, the issue of corporate governance has received considerable attention. The aim of this study is to explore the impact on firm performance of the board directors’ educations and professional background, termed quality grading (QG) in this work. The sample consists of 307 listed companies in the Taiwanese electronics industry from 2006 to 2010.
In contrast to the result of Chen (2011), the main result of this study show that the QG is not significantly associated to any proxy of firm performance in the Taiwanese electronics industry which means that it does not have any role in determining firm value. However, when level of education (LOE) and professional background (PB) are tested independently, the LOE has close significant relationship with firm performance whereas PB has no significant relationship with firm performance.
論文目次 Abstract i
摘要 ii
Acknowledgements iii
I. Introduction 1
1. Overview 1
2. Motivation 2
II. Literature Review 4
1. Quality grading 4
2. Board size 6
3. Board composition 8
4. Family control 9
III. Data and Methodology 12
1. Sample selection 12
2. Research design 12
3. Methodology 14
4. Descriptive Statistic 15
IV. Empirical result 16
V. Conclusion 23
References 43
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