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系統識別號 U0026-0107201411484700
論文名稱(中文) 公司法197條修訂對董監事質押行為與股價報酬之影響
論文名稱(英文) The Impact of the Amendment of Article 197-1 of Company Act on Collateralization by Board of Directors and Stock Return
校院名稱 成功大學
系所名稱(中) 會計學系
系所名稱(英) Department of Accountancy
學年度 103
學期 2
出版年 104
研究生(中文) 林姿妘
研究生(英文) Tzu-Yun Lin
學號 R16011226
學位類別 碩士
語文別 中文
論文頁數 48頁
口試委員 指導教授-吳清在
指導教授-王澤世
口試委員-楊曉瑩
口試委員-林囿成
中文關鍵字 股票質押  股票報酬  代理問題  公司治理 
英文關鍵字 Stock Collateralization  Stock Return  Corporate Governance  Agency Problems 
學科別分類
中文摘要 2011年11月9日,立法院三讀通過公司法第一百九十七條修訂一案,增訂之一第二項:「公開發行股票之公司董事以股份設定質權超過選任當時所持有之公司股份數額二分之一時,其超過之股份不得行使表決權,不算入已出席股東之表決權數。」該修法於同年11月11日由總統頒布施行。本文旨在探討修法對於董監事質押行為與公司股價報酬之影響,以驗證該法是否能有效降低董監事持股質押比率。
研究結果發現,修法後董監事持股質押行為減少。且若修法後,董監事於股東會開會前六個月平均質押比率較2011年修法前同時期平均質押比率低,則公司股價報酬較高,顯示投資人贊同此修法之本意,即降低董監事股票質押過於氾濫,及董監不當利用職務之便操縱公司財務的實務問題等。
其次,本研究也發現董監事於股東會當天之股票質押比率越高,公司股價當天股價報酬越低。當董監事質押比率越高,其投入公司之自有資金越少,當市場表現不佳時,董監事容易因為股價下跌壓力進而挪用公司資產等,使股東因潛在性代理問題降低對公司之評價。
此外,實證結果也發現,當公司董事長兼任總經理職務時,其於股東會當天之股票質押比率與股票報酬呈正相關。當董事長與公司總經理為同一人時,其因涉入管理職務而握有資訊上的優勢,其選擇股票質押而非轉讓股票之行為可被解讀為對公司未來預期之信心指標之一。
英文摘要 SUMMARY

This paper aims to investigate the effect of the amendment of the Article 197-1 of Company Act on November 9, 2011 on both behaviours of directors and stock market. We use the collateralization data from TEJ database and Taiwan Market Observation Post System and find out that the amendment produced the desired effects on lowering down the collateralization rate, and the higher the ratio of directors and supervisors collateralized on the day of shareholders’ meeting, the lower the company's stock return. Also the empirical results show that when the chairman serves as CEO of the company, its collateralization rate is positively correlated with stock returns on the day of the shareholders' meeting.

INTRODUCTION
On November 9, 2011, the Legislative Yuan passed the amendment of Article 197-1 of Company Act which is promulgated on November 11 by the President Ma, stating that board members with stock collateralized over 50% of shares holding when elected, neither do over shares can exercise its voting rights, nor cannot be counted into the attendance of the meeting. As the existing researches have focused on the relationship between high collateralization and financial crises of the company (Chiou et al. 2002), and on the relationship between stock loan and company performance (Chen and Hu 2001), this paper aims to investigate the impact of the amendment of the article 197-1 of the company act on collateralization by board of directors and its effect on stock returns.

MATERIALS AND METHODS
We attain our original data from both TEJ database and Taiwan Market Observation Post System. We firstly count the number of board members who have collateralization and analysis the loan ratio of the company in order to figure out the effect of the amendment of the act on board members. Secondly we design the empirical model to examine the relationship between companies’ collateralization rates on the date of shareholders’ meeting and stock returns.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The results show that the amendment produced the desired effects on lowering down the collateralization rate. Also, if, comparing to the same period before the amendment of the act, the average collateralization rate on the shareholders' meeting day is lower, the company has higher returns on stock.
Secondly, the results also find that the higher the ratio of directors and supervisors collateralized on the day of shareholders’ meeting, the lower the company's stock returns. The high collateralization rate of directors and supervisors implies the deviation of voting and cash flow rights. When the stock market doesn’t perform well, directors and supervisors thus face the financial pressure. Under the assumption of potential agency problems, the shareholders lower down the valuation of the company.
In addition, the empirical results also show that when the chairman serves as CEO of the company, its collateralization rate is positively correlated with stock returns on the day of the shareholders' meeting. Because of his/her involvement in management positions, his/her choice to collateralize stock rather than to transfer their shares of stock can be interpreted as indicators of confidence in the company's future

CONCLUSION
This paper contributes to the literature by examining the effect of the amendment of the Article 197-1 of the Company Act and providing the suggestions and references for the government. Since the difficulties of attaining the promptly collateralization rate on the date of shareholders’ meeting, we use the last reporting data before the meeting day as our sample. Our results show that the amendment of the Company Act does lower down the collateralization rate and reduce the collateralization behaviours by board of directors. The empirical results show that the collateralization rate is negatively correlated to the stock returns on the date of meeting which is in line with our expectation and also consistent with prior researches.
論文目次 摘要-------------------------------------------Ⅰ
誌謝------------------------------------------VI
目錄---------------------------------------- VII
表目錄---------------------------------------VIII
圖目錄-----------------------------------------IX
第壹章 緒論--------------------------------------1
第一節 研究背景與動機------------------------------1
第二節 研究目的與研究架構---------------------------4
第貳章 相關文獻探討--------------------------------7
第一節 代理理論-----------------------------------7
第二節 董監事持股比例------------------------------9
第三節 董監事股票質押程度--------------------------10
第四節 董事長股票質押程度--------------------------10
第參章 研究方法----------------------------------12
第一節 公司法第197條之1條文修正內容-----------------12
第二節 研究假說之建立-----------------------------13
第三節 變數定義與衡量-----------------------------16
第四節 實證模型之建立-----------------------------21
第五節 樣本選取與資料來源--------------------------22
第肆章 資料分析----------------------------------24
第一節 樣本結構----------------------------------24
第二節 樣本分析----------------------------------30
第伍章 實證結果分析-------------------------------35
第一節 敘述性統計 --------------------------------35
第二節 相關係數分析-------------------------------37
第三節 多元迴歸分析-------------------------------38
第陸章 結論與建議-------------------------------- 42
參考文獻----------------------------------------45
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